Corruption in South Africa isn’t simply a matter of bad morals or weak law enforcement. It’s embedded in processes of class formation – specifically, the formation of new black elites. This means corruption is primarily a matter of politics and the shape of the economy.
In a recently published paper, I attempt to shed fresh light on the unconvincing narratives that have been presented in the media, NGOs and academic circles about the events of the past 10 years.
These narratives generally depict events as a struggle between two opposing forces. On the one side are a network of politicians, officials, brokers and businessmen centred on former President Jacob Zuma and the Gupta family. All are bent on looting, state capture and self-enrichment. On the other are a band of righteous politicians and citizens. This group is seen as drawing together the “old” ANC, activists, “good” business and citizens in general. They are intent on rebuilding institutions and good governance, the rule of law, international credibility and fostering growth and development.
I argue that a much deeper set of social forces underlies and shapes the struggles within the governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), and the society more broadly. These political struggles are inseparable from struggles over the shape of the economy.
The primary process to change the economy has been the drive to accelerate the emergence of new black elites. But institutional interventions, such as black economic empowerment, have been insufficient.
Already, during the Thabo Mbeki period as well as the presidency of Nelson Mandela, an alternative informal political economic system was emerging at national, provincial and local levels. Through this, networks of state officials, ambitious entrepreneurs as well as small time operators, were rigging tenders or engaging in other kinds of fraud so as to sustain or establish businesses, or simply to finance self-enrichment.
Because of a number of factors there was little alternative for channelling the aspirations and burning sense of injustice of black elites and would be elites in post-apartheid South Africa. These factors include the property clause in the Constitution, the conservative strategies adopted by the ANC government and the fact that large corporations and white owned businesses dominated the economy.
This means that opportunities are few, demand is high and competition is fierce. In this context, the state is where people who are locked out are most likely to gain some access.
This links to the issue of violence. The emergence of new elite classes is often a ferociously contested, ugly and violent affair. South Africa is no different from many other post-colonial countries – or indeed the histories of the Euro-American elites that currently dominate the globe.
In South Africa this violence takes the form of burning down homes and state facilities, intimidation, assault, the deployment of the criminal-justice system to protect some and target others, and, increasingly, assassination.
I argue that this set of practices constitutes an informal political economic system. By a system I don’t mean a structure which is centrally coordinated or planned. What I’m referring to is a pervasive and decentralised set of interlocking networks that reinforce and compete with one another in mutually understood ways, and include the use of violence as a strategic resource.
This system preceded Zuma’s presidency, and extended far beyond the Zuma-Gupta network. The recent revelations about corruption at the Zondo commission into state capture, VBS mutual bank or in the book, How to steal a city by Crispian Olver, make this abundantly clear.
It should also be abundantly clear that the informal political-economic system necessarily entangles President Cyril Ramaphosa’s core network of institution builders.
Ramaphosa’s key challenge is to build a stable coalition within the ANC so as to embark on his project of institution building. His trajectory, and the future shape of corruption in South Africa, will be determined by the character of the coalition he can forge – or that will be forced on him – among party barons within the ANC.
For the purpose of building institutions and attracting investment, it will be necessary to establish as stable a coalition as possible. This means it will have to be a broad coalition. One thing is sure: the coalition will include corrupt figures. It already does. The informal system of patronage politics will remain pervasive.
Even so, Ramaphosa’s power is precarious in the ANC. The odds are stacked against success in establishing stability. For the medium-term the trajectory of politics is likely to be characterised by multiple contestations over material opportunities, political power and symbolic representation. This will give rise to an increasingly volatile, unstable and violent political space.
To return, then, to the prevailing narrative and its misreading of the politics of corruption.
Deep structural issues
The problem with the narrative is that it assumes it’s possible simply to remove some “rotten apples”“, and it sets standards Ramaphosa cannot possibly match.
Perhaps, though, it is a useful fiction for the mobilisation of civil society, journalists and judges, which at the very least may contribute to containing corruption?
There is some validity in this. Yet it fails to direct attention to the deep structural issues which give rise to corruption as an aspect of class formation.
The only long-term and stabilising solution would be to draw into the formal system some of the purposes of the informal system. This would require a much more fundamental redistribution of assets and wealth, which could be deployed in the large-scale formation of a new black business class, primarily located in manufacturing and agriculture, as well as to fixing the education crisis. The result would be the formation of professional, scientific and technical middle classes.
This kind of solution will not emerge from the Ramaphosa administration, which is much more fixed on reproducing the policies of the Mbeki era. The problem is that these were what created the opportunity for the rise of Zuma in the first place.
It’s been almost a year since the Commission of Inquiry into allegations of state capture in South Africa began to hear testimony.
Also known as the Zondo Commission, it is headed by Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, who has listened to 130 days of live testimony from more than 80 people. It is probing allegations that the government was captured by private business interests for their own benefit.
During it all, echoes of former South African President Jacob Zuma’s alleged involvement have become deafening. Through various testimony, Zuma has been directly implicated by current and former senior government officials and ministers. They have alleged, among other things, that Zuma leaned on them to help the Guptas – Zuma’s friends who are accused of having captured the state – and to fast-track a nuclear deal with Russia that would have bankrupted South Africa. Also, the governance failures that have resulted in the looting of parastatals, have been blamed squarely on state capture.
Zuma’s turn to give evidence has arrived. Not only does he deny that state capture exists – he’s called it a fake political tool – he’s also cast himself as a hapless victim.
Refusing to engage the concept, he said:
There are people who did things to others in one form or the other‚ and you can call it in any other name‚ not this big name “state capture”.
The allegations against him are that he orchestrated a network of corruption that hijacked South Africa’s developmental project.
The importance of Zuma testifying before the commission should not be underestimated. It will set a precedent that will either show that those that abuse power will be held to account or that the cycle of impunity will continue, reinforcing the unjust systems that enable state capture.
Understanding state capture
Originally, the theoretical concept of state capture referred to a form of grand corruption. In the case of South Africa, it can be defined as the formation of a shadow state, directed by a power elite. This shadow state operates within – and parallel to – the constitutional state in formal and informal ways. Its objective is to re-purpose state governance, aligning it with the power elites’ narrow financial or political interests, for their benefit.
State capture rests on a strategy to align arms of state and public institutions and business to support rent-seeking.
In the events being scrutinised by the commission, the evidence being led shows that actors made sure that all the conditions were created and processes lined up to extract more money than the actual goods and services cost as a way to enrich themselves.
This reveals the systemic nature of state capture. To be successful, it requires the deep cooperation and complicity of the highest office in the land to secure rents, hollow out accountability and maintain legitimacy.
The graphic below, by Robyn Foley, a senior researcher at the Centre for Complex Systems in Transition at Stellenbosch University, outlines the alleged strategy of capturing state-owned enterprises, installing compliant officials, undermining the functional operation of government institutions and discrediting critical voices.
The graphic points to a presidency where state capture became syndicated within the state and rent-seeking. Capture is a radical departure from the norms and values upon which a democratic developmental state depends. Like most liberal democracies, South Africa’s constitution provides for checks and balances that are supposed to limit such abuses of power. When these checks are undermined, and the balancing forces are biased, the system becomes a reinforcing loop of bad behaviour, spiralling towards an oligarchic authoritarian state.
In other words, a silent coup.
How did we get here?
Zuma set his presidency on the ticket of state-sponsored development. This entailed using state-owned enterprise procurement, tighter state control and Black Economic Empowerment to realise what has been termed radical economic transformation.
But it was precisely within this agenda, and the governance arrangements that supported it, that seeds for state capture were sown. Tighter state control meant that the flows of information were controlled by only a few, while state-owned enterprises used the biggest share of procurement rands.
There was already billions moving through these state owned enterprises and radical economic transformation was the perfect ideology to bring it all together.
But black business hardly benefited at all from the profits of state capture. If radical economic transformation were to be effected through the constitutional state, it would be enacted through economic policy that supported livelihoods and employment creation. In addition, state capture has hollowed out the very institutions that would have been able to realise radical economic transformation through the constitutional state.
Numerous events over the past decade point to a slowburn abuse of key state resources. One of the first was the irregular landing of a civilian plane at Waterkloof Military Air Base in 2013. The plane was carrying foreign guests to a family wedding hosted by Zuma’s friends, the Gupta family.
Two years later evidence emerged that millions of rands of public funds had been used illegally for upgrades to the then president’s Nkandla homestead. This spending was outlined in a report prepared by the former Public Protector Thuli Madonsela.
The turning point came only months after the release of the Public Protector’s State of Capture report, when Zuma fired then Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas in March 2017. The events sent a shock wave through South Africa, triggering mass protests and mobilised public outrage, forcing Zuma to initiate the robust inquiry into state capture.
Our unpublished research shows that, to date, there have been 28 public state capture investigations, inquiries and commissions. There are also 118 outstanding cases of corruption involving government officials and politicians in the intray of the newly appointed head of the country’s National Prosecuting Authority, Advocate, Shamila Batohi.
The true cost of the damage cost by state capture, including the destruction of institutions and lives, is unquantifiable.
South Africans may well be seduced by the prospect of Zuma taking the stand at the Zondo commission. But he was not alone in driving the state capture project. And, the network of actors and influencers is extensive and still very much active. This much has been laid bare in testimony before the commission.
Nina Callaghan, Robyn Foley, senior researchers at the Centre for Complex Systems in Transition at Stellenbosch University, contributed to the article.
South Africans can now visit 99 countries visa-free or with a visa-on-arrival, according to the latest Henley Passport Index.
This latest ranking of passport power and global mobility – which is based on exclusive data from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) – shows that overall, African states continue to fare poorly, although there have been some recent positive changes as more countries on the continent relax their visa policies.
South Africa dropped to 54th place on the ranking (down from 51st) after Djibouti changed its policy from visa-on-arrival to an e-visa system.
The Seychelles continues to occupy first place in the Sub-Saharan region, moving up to 27th place globally, with a visa-free/visa-on-arrival score of 150.
Mauritius remains in regional 2nd place, with a score of 145, and South Africa retains its 3rd place regionally. At the other end of the mobility spectrum in Africa, Somalia sits in last place, with citizens able to access just 31 destinations without a prior visa.
Globally, Japan and Singapore jointly hold first place, with a visa-free/visa-on-arrival score of 189. South Korea now sits in 2nd place on the index along with Finland and Germany, with citizens of all three countries able to access 187 destinations around the world without a prior visa.
With a visa-free/visa-on-arrival score of 183, the UK and the US now share 6th place – the lowest position either country has held since 2010, and a significant drop from their 1st-place spot in 2014.
“With a few significant exceptions, the latest rankings from the index show that countries around the world increasingly view visa-openness as critical to economic growth and mutual trust,” said Amanda Smit, managing partner at Henley & Partners South Africa.
“Asian countries’ dominance of the ranking is proof of that, showing the effects that progressive diplomacy has on global passport power.”
These are the countries South African passport holders can access without a visa:
* Indicates visa on arrival or eTA.
|Cape Verde Islands*||Mauritius||Togo*|
|Hong Kong (SAR China)||Maldives*||Tajikistan*|
|Macao (SAR China)||South Korea|
|Marshall Islands*||Palau Islands*||Vanuatu|
|Antigua and Barbuda||Dominican Republic||St. Lucia|
|Bahamas||Grenada||St. Vincent and the Grenadines|
|Barbados||Haiti||Trinidad and Tobago|
|British Virgin Islands||Jamaica||Turks and Caicos|
|Dominica||St. Kitts and Nevis|
South Africa is one of the 10 most heavily taxed countries in the world (tax-to-GDP ratio), according to the a report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Personal taxes have increased by 125% over the past decade. From 2017 to 2018, personal income tax accounted for R1.22-trillion in taxes collected by the national government and ranks as the country's number-one source of tax, accounting for 38% of all tax revenue. Just behind this is value added tax or VAT accounting for 24%, followed by company income tax, which accounts for 20%.
Because of these excessive figures, South Africa finds itself among the world's top-ten-highest-taxed countries in the world according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
"We're up there with the New Zealands and the Denmarks of the world. It's bad when you're not getting a return," Wayne Duvenage, chairperson of the Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse, told The Money Show.
"There is sufficient money, it all comes down to governance. Iinstead, we have cronyism, maladministration, corruption. If we can fix that, we'll have the best country in the world," he added.
Out of 115 countries with substantial tax data, South Africa ranks as the 8th-most-taxed country in the world, just behind New Zealand and Sweden. Namibia and Lesotho are even more highly taxed, however, featuring in second and third place just behind Denmark which took the top spot as the world's most taxed country.
The world average for tax according to the IMF was 15.4% in 2017 and South African residents pay more taxes than the United Kingdom (25.7%), Australia (22.2%), Brazil (12.7%) and the United States (11.9%).
South Africa’s four major telecommunications companies have asked President Cyril Ramaphosa to support Huawei in South Africa, reports the Sunday Times.
In a letter dated 7 June, the CEOs of Cell C, MTN, Vodacom and Telkom wrote to the president to ask for help in dealing with the repercussions of an executive order signed by US President Donald Trump against Huawei.
In May, the Trump administration issued an order that could restrict Huawei from selling equipment in the US. Washington also put the company on a blacklist, threatening its supply of American components – from semiconductors, to the Google apps that run on its smartphones.
The CEOs said that blacklisting Huawei in South Africa would hinder the rollout of a new 5G network, as well as impact the country’s existing 3G and 4G networks.
Ramaphosa’s spokesperson Khusela Diko said that the president would align with his Chinese counterpart, president Xi Jinping, and back Huawei in its fight against Trump.
“Huawei provides a strong backbone to our telecommunication sector and is the frontrunner in 5G network,” said Diko. “The advancements made in that sector are largely because of the investment Huawei made in South Africa.
“The president expressed his concern at any efforts to curtail the efforts of Huawei to deliver a comprehensive, and what we believe to be an advanced solution in the telecommunication space.”
Huawei has previously pledged to invest heavily in companies that welcome it with open arms.
“Huawei will invest heavily in those countries where we are welcome,” said global vice president of marketing insights Andrew Williamson
“Restricting competition in 5G infrastructure will have huge costs. Governments and companies around the world will have to address those costs against the supposed risks of national security” .
Williamson added that rolling out 5G technology around the world will be a challenge if the US goes ahead with its sanctions.
Trump eases restrictions on Huawei
After a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Trump told reporters on Saturday that he would delay restrictions against Huawei, letting US companies resume sales to China’s largest telecommunications equipment maker.
Trump later tweeted that his meeting with Xi was “far better than expected.” He said Chinese President Xi Jinping had promised to buy “tremendous” amounts of US agricultural products in exchange.
After Trump and Xi met at the G-20 on Saturday, the two countries plan to restart trade talks that broke down last month.
Trump told reporters he wouldn’t put additional tariffs on China for the “time being,” and that he would allow US companies to supply Huawei.
“US companies can sell their equipment to Huawei,” Trump said. “We’re talking about equipment where there’s no great national security problem with it.”
Source: Business Tech South Africa
The South African government believes that the business processing industry is key to job creation. And the sector has indeed created thousands of jobs, in particular for the country’s youth – a group that bears a disproportionate share of joblessness.
But unlike in India, the growth of South Africa’s business process outsourcing sector has not generated the kind of jobs that offer workers the chance of progressing up the career ladder. In South Africa, workers tend to get stuck in the same, low-level and poorly paid jobs with very few prospects of promotion or career development. Their working conditions are also generally poor.
South Africa’s outsourcing industry grew significantly between 1997, when it hosted an estimated 185 contact centre operations, to 2010, when the figure was well over 1000. More recent data isn’t available. But data from 2017 estimated that 228 642 people were employed in the sector.
Most business process services jobs such as in the call and contact centres are taken up by young workers. In the context of the country’s high youth unemployment of more than 52%, government sees the sector as one vehicle for absorbing young workers. However, the sector’s failure to create opportunities for career advancement is proving a trap for young people.
Upgrading technology and processes
The sector is always changing, upgrading its technologies and processes. But do these changes translate into positive impacts for employees? We set out to answer this question in our new research article. We wanted to know whether the upgrading by firms contributed to social upgrading: that is, improvements in wages, working conditions, workers’ freedom of association and bargaining power.
We found that upgrading by firms could lead to social upgrading in the form of improvements in livelihood opportunities. But our research also found that the upgrading by firms led to intense workplace monitoring, insecure employment relations, a lack of career opportunities and adverse physical and psychological impacts.
Our findings suggest that policy makers must ensure working conditions in contact centres are regulated for workers’ well-being.
A stressful environment
Workers view contact or call centres as a good entry point into formal employment as well as a good way to earn at least some income.
But they are also often overcrowded spaces. One person told us they and their colleagues felt like “packed sardines” in their tiny cubicles. The working environment was described variously as “stressful” “strenuous” “demotivating” and “frustrating”.
Contact centre firms have strict workplace controls. Worker performance is carefully quantified and measured based on sales targets or how many calls workers make. Their work quality, specifically how they interact with customers, is also measured.
And the introduction of various technologies, like predictive dialling and automated customer-relationships management tools, worsen employee stress. This is because workers have to juggle more systems and technologies while responding to customer queries and complaints.
Contact centre jobs are rarely stable and secure. Firms adopt flexible employment structures, a mix of permanent and temporary workers. To keep costs down, they prefer to hire workers through labour agencies and contractors. However, this often results in the exploitation of workers.
This flexibility makes workers vulnerable. Union representation remains low among call centre workers. Workers are often fired without the option of arbitration or settlement, affecting their future career prospects. BPESA, the industry association, estimated that in 2016 the industry’s attrition rates stood at about 37.6%, compared to India’s 30%.
Lack of labour mobility
Another problem with this flexible, precarious environment is that there’s little room for agents’ internal progression within a firm. This is largely because of a high volume of temporary and part-time employees hired through labour agencies or contractors.
This stands in contrast to India, where contact centre workers have a greater chance of achieving upward labour mobility. This is due to India’s position as the world’s leading player in outsourced services. India’s bigger business processing outsourcing industry enables workers to bargain for promotions and higher incomes.
Job creation in South Africa has slowed down since 2000, and employment is becoming more skill intensive. The business processing industry is also showing signs of economic upgrading. The unskilled and semi-skilled workforce, therefore, faces limited employment opportunities.
Youth, particularly black South Africans, struggle to secure meaningful employment in the local labour markets. Those who find work in contact centres have less hope for career progression. While the average tenure of agents in call centres is around two years, we met a few workers who were agents for more than five years in the industry and asked them why they were still working in the sector. One agent replied that they had no choice but to continue to work and to hope that working conditions would eventually improve.
Recommendations for policy makers
The South African government needs to rethink its reliance on job incentives for employment generation in the business process outsourcing sector. Incentives have generated some jobs. But the questionable working conditions in the contact centres can have detrimental long-term impacts on workers.
Without adequate job opportunities generated elsewhere in the local labour markets, contact centre workers face constrained labour mobility, risk of long-term unemployment and poverty.
The state, in partnership with the industry and the education sector, should also step up skills training provision (technical and soft skills) for the new workforce to be better suited to the demands of the contemporary labour markets.
High unemployment and the prevalence of low-paid work, primarily in the informal sector, can affect young work seekers’ material, psychological and social well-being.
To avoid the real potential for an erosion of working standards and systemic exploitation that comes with some of the jobs in the business process outsourcing sector the government must ensure that it has the institutional capacity to monitor working conditions in contact centres.
South Africa’s new national government and nine new provincial executives have taken office following recent elections. They all have a huge job to do, and it cannot be business as usual.
The country is at a turning point following the nine years of former President Jacob Zuma’s ruinous administration. It needs strong, principled leaders in all spheres of government to put the country on a path of economic growth and to improve the quality of governance.
Many of the current governance failures are linked to corruption or state capture. This includes malfeasance in state-owned enterprises such as Eskom, the power utility and Transnet, the rail and port company. There are also other serious governance problems in some national government departments and provinces and in most of the municipalities.
The main governance problems are non-compliance with legislative requirements designed to keep the running of government clean and free from corruption. These include the Public Finance Management Act and the Municipal Finance Management Act.
The biggest challenges include a lack of oversight and accountability, poor appointments in key positions, tolerance of corruption, and poor management and technical skills.
All these problems can be fixed if some basic steps are taken. These can be narrowed down to a list of seven. The focus should be on improving governance and weeding out corruption. The list would include: bringing those involved in corruption to book, setting clear targets for each minister, imposing a proper accountability structure and appointing an ethics officer. Accountability will also be improved if the involvement of communities is improved.
The added ingredient is leadership. An important first step would be for President Cyril Ramaphosa and the nine new premiers to show commitment to ensuring integrity and to improve transparency and accountability.
South Africa performs badly in the global governance context. The country scores 43% and is 73rd out of 180 countries on the latest Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. The index focuses on public sector corruption. It draws on surveys and assessments by experts.
It’s also gone backwards from last year in the latest Ibrahim Index on African Governance. South Africa is in 7th position with a combined score of 68%, which is slightly down from 2017. Mauritius is in the first place with 79,5%.
South Africa’s weakest score (57,4%) on this index is on transparency and accountability.
The index defines governance as the provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their state. It also factors in the state’s responsibility to deliver to its citizens.
One of the significant ways of improving accountability and governance would be to ensure that the work of the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture results in the successful prosecution of perpetrators.
Other practical steps that should be considered are:
Setting clear targets for each of the new ministers and members of the executive councils. This must include regular public reports on their performance;
Adopting a good governance programme that focuses on enhancing integrity, transparency and accountability;
Sourcing the best expertise in the public and private sectors to fill key senior management positions;
Appointing a senior manager as “chief ethics officer”. This could be the secretary to the national cabinet and secretary to the cabinet in each province;
Strengthening the oversight role of the nine provincial legislatures and Parliament. This could be done by ensuring compliance with the accountability requirements in the various pieces of legislation;
Ensuring the effective use of information technology to enhance good governance; and
Creating an enabling environment for more constructive community involvement when it comes to delivering public services.
Practical measures like this would help improve the quality of governance. It would also contribute to improving South Africa’s score on the Ibrahim Index.
Why governance matters
Poor governance compounds the already huge task facing the newly elected executives. South Africa has huge economic and social inequalities. This means that it needs a new pragmatic approach that uses the skills and expertise of all citizens, beyond what the government is able to provide.
This implies the development of innovative solutions to some of the country’s biggest problems. These include a lack of adequate housing, poor education and a lack of safety. And every day ordinary South Africans feel the brunt of dysfunctional municipalities. These need to be turned into well-functioning entities that serve their communities well.
The “co-production” method, which entails using the combined expertise of both the private and public sectors in the design and delivery of public services, should be used on a much larger scale. A good example of successful co-production is Partners for Possibility, which makes a significant impact in improving education.
It’s been 25 years since democracy dawned in South Africa. But apartheid’s legacies still scar the country. Poverty remains high; inequality remains extreme – and both follow racial lines.
The same is true for unemployment. By conservative official standards, it stands at a staggering 27,6%, and it disproportionately affects black South Africans.
Effective policies to combat South Africa’s plight require good ideas, resources and political will. They also, however, need to build on a solid understanding of the problem in the first place. How can defects in the labour market be tackled if we don’t know what’s actually going on there? Good and relevant statistics are central to effective policies.
Unfortunately, there are limits to how well South Africa’s statistics can capture the situation in the country.
The international gold standard for employment figures comes from the International Labour Organisation in Geneva. According to its template, you count as unemployed if you (a) don’t work (a lot) for money, (b) are available for work, and (c) are actively looking for a job.
This definition originated in the 1920s. It was clearly built on the image of white, male factory workers in Europe and North America. If these men lost their jobs, that spelt social and political trouble. Unemployment statistics functioned as a thermometer for how well such factory economies hummed along.
Immediately after apartheid ended, South Africa’s statisticians tried to move away from the traditional definition of unemployment. For instance, they experimented with various more extended definitions of unemployment that would capture what they now call the “discouraged work seekers”.
But, as our recent research found, the country’s appetite for statistical creativity has slowly waned. It has increasingly embraced the ill-fitting international standard. But this global standard risks creating a skewed image of South Africa’s labour market woes. Complacency and poorly crafted policies may be the result.
Waning appetite for creativity
There are a number of problems with sticking to narrow, global definitions of “unemployment”, “job searching” or “industry” in the South African context.
For instance, the spatial legacies of apartheid mean that for many South Africans, industrial jobs are hundreds of miles removed from where they live. Many people don’t actively look for jobs because they know all too well there are none to be found anywhere near. For all intents and purposes, they are unemployed, and in a particularly hopeless situation. But they would not pass the official International Labour Organisation definition – and so they drop out of the stats.
In rural areas, many people – and women in particular – labour on the land to grow their own food. They might greatly prefer a salaried job to escape poverty. But their hand-to-mouth existence may prohibit the luxury of an extensive “job search”. They, too, would fail the statistical litmus test.
Simply put, international unemployment standards would ignore a big part of South Africa’s labour market problems. This would do an injustice to women and the black population, in particular.
The other problem with existing definitions is that nuance tends to fall by the wayside. Take “discouraged work seeker”. It’s an ambiguous category. Whether you qualify depends on your own judgement: maybe you don’t look for a job actively, but would you like one. Not everyone answering “no” is voluntarily jobless. And people might answer “yes” even though they indeed lack personal effort to find work.
Such vagaries are at odds, however, with the exactness that’s expected from statistics. Statistics privilege easy-to-quantify indicators, and important nuances disappear.
Bold creativity needed
This tendency to ignore soft, hard-to-measure issues is amplified by politicians who happily pounce on statistics that displease them.
Statistics South Africa has over the years often been criticised – unfairly, we think – for unemployment figures that tried to paint a more realistic picture. Yet less than rock-solid statistics have invited the charge that Stats SA would inflate the numbers intentionally, or otherwise manipulate them.
Once Stats SA narrowed the definition, criticism came from the other side – in this case the political opposition. To safeguard its credibility, the agency had little other option than to seek refuge in an international definition that would withstand local criticism, even if it fails to do local circumstances justice.
South Africa faces a genuine dilemma in its statistics. It is impossible to capture the complex ills of its economy and society in single headline figures. Such numbers, and the colourful graphs they generate, ready to be tweeted, are tempting. But all too often, embracing this strategy biases the numbers against people who fall between the cracks.
Our research suggests that the country’s statisticians should be bold and paint a picture that does justice to the colourful quilt that is the “rainbow nation”. And politicians have a duty to respect these efforts if they are genuinely committed to effective policies.
When the new South Africa was born in the mid-1990s, it was carried by a spirit of daring and breaking the mould. May that spirit – even in a field as boring as statistics – prevail in the future, as well.
In a bid to support the further growth of SMEs in South Africa, Maersk has announced plans to offer digital trade finance in South Africa.
Global Head of Trade Finance for Maersk, Vipul Sardana, stated this in a statement released by the company.
According to him, “Focusing more on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) represents a strong opportunity for Maersk to introduce more customers to our end-to-end supply chain and logistics products, services and solutions. In that sense, South Africa is a critical market for us.”
Launched as a response to simplify customers’ supply chain, Maersk Trade Finance represents a different way of financing containerised shipments.
“Cape Town, South Africa, May 13, 2019 – Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are productive drivers of inclusive economic growth in South Africa and around the world. Researchers estimated that in South Africa SMEs make up 91 per cent of formal businesses, provide employment to about 60 per cent of the labor force and total economic output accounts for roughly 34 per cent of GDP,” he said.
“While contributing significantly to the economy, SMEs often face difficulties in accessing finance. According to the ICC Banking Commission, there is a massive trade finance gap in Africa, which sits between $110 billion and $120 billion.
“While trade finance has been a catalyst for expansion, for most SMEs, access to funds has been restrictive due to strict collateral requirements and credit background checks. As digital trade finance develops into an essential alternative, SMEs will be able to access additional capital for their growth,” explained Dirk Van den Berg, Head of Maersk Trade Finance in South Africa.
He added: “This new digital trade finance solution of Maersk provides customers easy access to capital in foreign currency for international trade to finance their business needs when they need it; a simple, end-to-end digital solution removing the paper trail from traditional financing options, and faster release of funds at gate-in.
“In other words, this one-stop-shop provides a more effective way to manage the ocean leg of end-to-end global supply chains, both financially and operationally, ”Van den Berg added.
Since 2016, Maersk Trade Finance has disbursed $0.7billion in loans to over 200 customers worldwide.
“The growing Maersk Trade Finance network of offices stretches from India to Netherlands, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and the United States (all states other than California).”
South Africans are about to vote in the most competitive election they’ve had since democracy began in 1994. But, despite this, the poll will have far more impact on the factional battle within the governing African National Congress (ANC) than on the contest between it and other parties for control of government.
The election follows a decline in the ANC vote from just under 70% in 2004 to around 54% in 2016’s local elections. This seemed to signal that the ANC was no longer guaranteed re-election nationally and in most provinces. There has been much talk of the ANC vote sinking below 50%, forcing it to seek coalition partners if it wants to govern.
In Gauteng, the country’s economic heartland, the ANC won only 46% in the 2016 municipal elections and was forced into opposition in two metropolitan areas – Tshwane and Johannesburg. This happened because the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a breakaway from the ANC which espouses a more militant brand of African nationalism, agreed to support the country’s second biggest party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), even though they differ on just about everything. This raised the possibility that a similar arrangement this time will mean the ANC will no longer govern in Gauteng or nationally.
So, is South Africa about to see its first election in which national power changes hands? No. The ANC is almost certain to remain in government in all the eight provinces it controls, including Gauteng. This will leave the Western Cape, which the DA holds and is likely to retain despite claims that it is in trouble, as the only province in which the ANC is not in government.
This prediction is not based on opinion polls which, in this election, have continued their tradition of doing more to confuse than inform. One poll has the ANC at 61%. Another says it is on the cusp of losing its majority . The DA’s projected vote veers just as wildly. The only constant is claims that the EFF will improve although this is not what is happening in municipal by-elections, where its support remains largely unchanged.
So, the polls tell us little and there is a good argument for ignoring them. But they do have one use. They largely agree on what won’t happen: the ANC won’t lose power.
Why the ANC is sitting pretty
Predicting that the ANC will remain in government outside the Western Cape is based on political common sense.
Talk of the ANC dropping below 50% often ignores the reality that, just about everywhere, the opposition is far behind it. The nearest an opposition party comes to challenging it outside the Western Cape is in Gauteng where the DA won 37% in 2016. Elsewhere, the nearest opposition party trails by 30 percentage points or more. The only way the ANC could be removed from government is by another deal between the DA and EFF.
But EFF leader Julius Malema has said that it will not make a deal with the DA and is more likely to look to a coalition with the ANC. What politicians say about coalitions cannot always be taken seriously and later Malema said the EFF would consider a coalition with the DA or ANC if they agreed to improve conditions in the townships where black poor people live.
But a DA-EFF coalition seems impossible, whatever Malema says now. For one thing their positions on land, a core EFF concern, are diametrically opposed. This does not matter in local government, which does not decide on land policy. It would matter hugely in national government and to a degree in the provinces.
If there is no DA-EFF deal, the only way the ANC can lose its hold on government anywhere is if either party wins a majority or at least enough to allow them to govern with small parties. But in Gauteng, no poll puts the DA above 38% - its numbers elsewhere are much weaker. In North West province, the ANC’s weakest outside Gauteng and Western Cape, the EFF is the second biggest party and it won only 16% in 2016. No poll has the EFF vote improving by more than eight percentage points.
Nationally and outside the Western Cape, then, two results are possible: the ANC wins a majority or is by far the biggest party and the only one able to form a coalition.
The reality which predictions of a change in government ignore -– the absence of another party which could defeat the ANC – means that, even if the ANC does as badly as one poll says it will, it will still be the party of government just about everywhere.
But, while the election will not change the government, it may change the balance between the two factions which compete for power within the ANC. -– One supports President Cyril Ramaphosa; the other backed former president Jacob Zuma.
The Zuma faction is still strongly represented in ANC decision-making forums. The battle between the two factions continues and the difference between them is often greater than that between the ANC and parts of the opposition. It is impossible to make sense of anything the ANC does without knowing which faction was behind it.
Ramaphosa was elected in 2017 because key ANC figures, most notably current deputy president David Mabuza, believed the ANC could not win this election if it was led by the Zuma faction. Ramaphosa’s credibility with some ANC power brokers depends, therefore, on showing that he can stem the ANC’s decline at the polls.
If the ANC improves on its 2016 vote, Ramaphosa will have presided over the first increase in its vote for 15 years. This will greatly improve his chances of winning re-election as ANC president at its next conference in 2022 because it will signal to ANC politicians that he can deliver more seats.
Because many South Africans are excluded from the benefits of the market, seats in municipal councils and legislatures are often the only ticket into the middle-class. So, an ANC gain in this election is certain to strengthen Ramaphosa now and in 2022 by showing that his leadership offers more opportunities to ANC politicians.
Even if it matches the last result or comes close, ANC power brokers could decide that Ramaphosa saved them from the opposition benches.
If the ANC drops to near 50%, whether Ramaphosa would be at risk of losing in 2022 would depend on whether ANC delegates could be persuaded to blame Zuma and his supporters. That is hardly assured. What is clear is that, the worse the ANC does, the better the Zuma group’s chances are of removing Ramaphosa at the national conference in 2022.
The two factions have very different approaches to governing and so the battle between them affects the country’s future. It is this battle, not that between the parties, which will be shaped by the election result.
This article was updated to reflect the correct date for when the ANC could remove Ramaphosa, if they chose to do so.